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Abstract
Developing economies with high levels of open or hidden unemploy-
ment face structural transformation problems. Unlike in mature economies
there are no structural aggregate demand problems, and sustained aggre-
gate demand stimulus can lead to a prot squeeze in the modern sector
and deindustrialization. Adaptations of functional nanceto developing
economies should aim to stabilize the level and composition of demand
at values that are consistent with a target rate of growth of the modern
sector. Populist temptations, however, may lead to deindustrialization.
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1 Introduction
The DSGE orthodoxy along with most of the endogenous growth theory explain
long-run growth almost exclusively by the supply side. Aggregate demand policy
has a limited role and mainly comes into play via tax distortions and adverse
supply-side e¤ects. Dominant schools within the (post-) Keynesian tradition
have gone to the opposite extreme. Aggregate demand is seen as the driver
of economic growth, and supply-side constraints have been dismissed as largely
irrelevant.1 Like their mainstream counterparts, post-Keynesian economists
have applied their models to both developing and advanced economies.
This paper adopts a di¤erent perspective. Both the demand and supply
sides are important for long-run growth and, even as a rst approximation,
a distinction must be made between mature and dual economies. Labor
is a binding supply-side constraint on long-run growth in mature economies,
but unemployment data can be misleading. According to the World Bank, in
2019 the unemployment rates in India and France were 2.6 and 9.1 percent,
respectively.2 These gures suggest that if aggregate demand were to expand
rapidly, India would experience labor shortages sooner than France. The Indian
unemployment rate does not, however, tell us much about the extent of un- and
underemployment. For all its shortcomings, the French rate provides a much
more reliable picture of the degree of slack in the labor market.
France does not have full employment, but an economy need not have full
employment in order to be mature.3 Economies are mature, and labor becomes
a relevant constraint on the medium- and long-run growth rate, if attempts to
raise the growth rate signicantly through aggressive aggregate demand policies
would generate labor shortages and ination within a relatively short period.
By this criterion the French, Japanese and US economies are labor constrained:
o¢ cial unemployment rates may be misleading, but even taking into account
discouraged workers, Chinese-style annual growth rates of ten percent could
not be maintained for more than a couple of years; immigration could alleviate
impending labor shortages, but political constraints block this option.
Most developing countries, by contrast, have dual economies with large
amounts of hidden unemployment and underemployment. India may experi-
ence shortages of some types of skilled workers, but underemployment, learning
by doing and the potential for technological catch-up imply that growth rates
of ten percent a year could be maintained for many years without a general
labor shortage. The supply-side constraints on the modern sector come from a
combination of low stocks of private xed capital, inadequate public infrastruc-
ture and shortages of human capital. The precise form of the capital constraint
di¤ers across countries, and the details are crucial in the formulation of con-
1See e.g. Lavoie (2014, p. 360) and Hein (2014, p. 181). Blecker and Settereld (2019)
provide a recent survey and discussion of di¤erent strands of heterodox macroeconomics and
the debates between them.
2https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=FR-IN
3The level of full employment is ill-dened in economies with employment hysteresis.
Employment hysteresis does not, however, eliminate constraints on the long-run growth rate
of employment.
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crete development policies. For the purposes of this paper, however, the point
is simply that current resources must be invested in order to expand the modern
sector.
The supply side interacts with the demand side. Mature economies may
su¤er from structural aggregate demand problems (secular stagnation). The
long-run growth rate of the capital stock is constrained by the natural growth
rate(the growth rate of the labor force in e¢ ciency units), and a high saving
rate leads to chronic aggregate demand deciencies. In these circumstances
scal and monetary policy along the lines suggested by functional nancemay
be needed to sustain full employment growth and achieve a desirable share of
investment in output (Lerner 1943).
Dual economies face a structural transformation problem. With a small mod-
ern sector and large amounts of (open or hidden) unemployment, the policy
targets must change. Capital constraints make it impossible to achieve full em-
ployment in a meaningful sense, but aggregate demand policy may target the
growth rate of the modern sector and the full utilization of the capital stock in
the modern sector, rather than full employment.
High saving rates do not cause structural aggregate demand problems in
dual economies; they represent an opportunity to increase investment and the
growth rate of the modern sector.4 The private sector must have an incentive to
invest, however, and macroeconomic policies are needed to stabilize the demand
for the output of the modern sector. In open economies, additionally, balance of
payments problems must be avoided, and the domestic modern sector must be
internationally competitive. But successful development requires high saving,
and a sensible aggregate demand will typically avoid persistent decits and high
public debt.
The analysis in this paper emphasizes sectoral di¤erences and interactions
between the demand and supply sides. There are strong a¢ nities with classical
development theory, but the paper also builds directly on Keynesian theory and
my work with Soon Ryoo on functional nance.5 The one-sector model in section
2 illustrates a key result from Ryoo and Skott (2013): the long-run debt income
ratio is inversely related to the growth rate of the economy. In a mature economy
the growth rate is constrained by the growth of the labor supply in e¢ ciency
units, and causation runs from growth to debt. In a dual economy, however,
there is no unambiguous one-way causation; the inverse relation between the
debt ratio and economic growth reects a tradeo¤ between accumulation and
current consumption.
One-sector models have intrinsic limitations, but the severity of the limita-
tions depend on the questions the models are asked to address and the economies
to which they are applied. A onesector model may be adequate for the analy-
4As argued by Nurkse (1953, p.1), the supply side constraints in developing economies
derive from the shortage of capital which is "at the centre of the problem of development".
5See Ryoo and Skott (2013) and Skott (2016) for formalizations and extensions of functional
nance to the long run. The application of functional nance to dual economies is discussed in
Skott (2020). Ros (2013) provides an overview and discussion of classical development theory
and its relation to neoclassical and Keynesian theories of economic growth.
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sis of aggregate demand shocks in an economy like France, the US or Japan.
For India, Brazil or South Africa, however, the sectoral di¤erences are greater,
and the interaction between the sectors should not be ignored. The model is
extended in section 3, which adds a second sector. A modern sector is able
to draw in workers from an informal sector with underemployment and low in-
comes but, unlike in the one-sector model, the two sectors also interact on the
demand side. Workers in the informal sector consume both formal and informal
sector goods, and incomes in the formal sector are spent on informal as well as
formal sector goods.6
An economy is dual if the modern sector has a highly elastic labor supply at
a wage rate that makes it protable for rms in the modern sector to expand
production. The model implies that average incomes in the informal sector are
demand determined and that populist temptations to boost aggregate demand
and/or redistribute income towards the informal sector can lead to premature
maturity. These temptations can become particularly strong if the economy is
open, contains a resource-based third sector oil, as a shorthand and obtains
a windfall gain from rising oil revenues.
This possibility is considered in the three sector-model in section 4. The
model implies the possibility of a Dutch disease in which a temporary oil boom
sets in motion a process of permanent deindustrialization as the economy en-
ters a development trap.7 This part of the paper can be seen as a companion
piece to Martins and Skott (2020). The focus is di¤erent, however. Martins
and Skott analyze sources of ination and the short- to medium-run impact of
ination targeting and balanced budgets in developing countries; the present
paper looks primarily at scal policy and its implications in the medium and
long run. Both papers share an obvious limitation: aggregate demand policy is
only one element in a larger package of policies. Mismanagement of aggregate
demand can jeopardize economic development, but complementary policies, in-
cluding industrial and education polices, are crucial for successful development.
A discussion of these broader issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
The concluding section 5 considers the relation between this paper and some
mainstream and (post-) Keynesian perspectives.
6The model is related to those in Razmi et al. (2012) and Skott and Gomez-Ramirez (2018).
Neither of these papers, however, discusses scal policy, and the detailed specications also
di¤er in some respects.
7Development traps were central to classical development theory (e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan
1943, Leibenstein 1957). Kaldor (1966, 1970) inspired a large literature on related themes
of increasing returns to scale and uneven development. The Dutch disease has been ana-
lyzed by Corden and Neary (1982) and Krugman (1987), among others; Rodrik (2016) and
Bresser-Pereira et al. (2014) are among the contributons that have emphasized the dangers
of overvalued exchange rates and premature deindustrialization.
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2 The warranted growth rate in a one-sector
model
Disregarding short-run lags and assuming that consumption is a linear function
of after-tax wage income, after-tax capital income and wealth, the goods market
equilibrium condition for a closed economy can be written
Y
K
=
C
K
+
I
K
+
G
K
= cw(1  )(1  ) Y
K
+ c(1  t)( Y
K
+ rb) (1)
+(1 + b) + (g + ) + 
Y;C; I andG denote output, consumption, investment and government spending
on goods and services. Wage and capital income are taxed at the rates  and
t, respectively.8 The parameters cw; c and  are the consumption rates out of
wages, capital income (prots and interest payments on the public debt) and
wealth. The specication of consumption includes several standard consumption
functions as special cases. With cw = c; consumption depends on aggregate
disposable income and wealth; the case with c = 0 yields a specication in
which labor income and wealth determine consumption, as in many traditional
Keynesian consumption functions; a post-Keynesian/classical specication of
consumption has  = 0 and c < cw: Private wealth is taken to be equal to the
sum of the capital stock K and the public debt B; and b denotes the ratio of
public debt to capital ((K +B)=K = 1 + b);9 g;  and  are the growth rate of
the capital stock, the rate of depreciation, and the ratio of government spending
to capital (G=K). The share of the government sector in the economy  the
value of  is contentious but, for present purposes, may be taken as exogenous;
through some decision process it has been decided how many resources to devote
to public health, education and other public services.
The output capital ratio is determined by the choice of technique and the
utilization rate of capital, u. Smooth capital-labor substitution plays a central
role in mainstream growth models, but the Cambridge Capital Controversy cast
doubt on this approach, and I shall take the production technique as given,
Y = minfK; Lg
This Leontief specication may be the ex-post reection of a choice of technique
and an exogenously given real rate of interest; Skott (1989).
Some strands of post-Keynesian economics see the utilization rate as an
accommodating variable that can take pretty much any value, even in the long
8The tax rate t may be interpreted broadly to include indirect taxes on luxury goods which
can act as a consumption tax. Wealth taxes could be also be included but would not add
anything for present purposes.
9 In a corporate economy household wealth takes the form of nancial assets, including
equity and corporate bonds, rather than direct ownership of xed capital. The analysis of
scal policy in a mature economy is extended in this direction by Ryoo and Skott (2013).
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run. This approach is unconvincing on both behavioral and empirical grounds,
and I assume that the utilization rate will be at a normalor desiredlevel in
steady growth, u = ud; I shall return to this issue in section 5.
The desired utilization rate is determined by structural characteristics of
goods and labor markets, and it need not be constant; in the US, for instance,
it may have declined since the 1980s as a result of decreasing competition in the
goods market. For present purposes, however, there is no harm in taking the
desired rate of utilization as constant, and I shall assume that steady growth
requires that Y=K = ud = . With these assumptions, the equilibrium condi-
tion (1) describes a long-run tradeo¤ between accumulation and consumption
(private and public):
g +  =    [C
K
+ ] (2)
Equation (2) denes a warranted rate of growth, g. For given values of the
private consumption ratio C=K, the output capital ratio  and the government
consumption ratio , the equation determines the unique accumulation rate that
is compatible with goods market equilibrium; an increase in the consumption
ratio reduces the warranted rate.10
The natural rate of growth the growth rate of the labor supply in e¢ ciency
units sets an upper limit on the accumulation rate in a mature economy; the
left hand side of equation (2) cannot exceed the natural rate. A combination
of high saving rates (a low value of C=K), low government spending and a low
natural rate of growth therefore produces structural aggregate demand prob-
lems: in the absence of policy intervention, the left hand side will exceed the
right hand side. The problem can be addressed by sustained scal stimulus; tax
reductions and high government debt ratios or a sustained increase in govern-
ment spending can be used to maintain full-employment growth (e.g. Schlicht
2006, Ryoo and Skott 2013, Skott 2016).
Matters are quite di¤erent in dual economies with large amounts of underem-
ployment and a supply of labor to the modern sector that is (almost) perfectly
elastic. The capital stock rather than the labor supply represents the bind-
ing supply-side constraint in the modern sector. Unlike in mature economies,
investment can absorb high saving rates: high accumulation rates are desirable,
and there is no structural aggregate demand problem.
While Harrods rst problem (the reconciliation between the warranted and
natural rates of growth) applies only to mature economies, the second problem
 the instability of the warranted growth path may be relevant in both dual
and mature economies. Dual economies, like their mature counterparts, may
require active stabilization policy. The focus in this paper is on the properties of
long-run growth paths, and I assume that this stabilization policy is successful:
there may be short-run uctuations in utilization rates, but stabilization policy
ensures that ud provides a good approximation to the average, long-run value
10The equation is similar to the consumption-growth frontier in classical economics; see e.g.
Foley et al. (2019).
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of u.11
With this assumption, a self-contained modern sector with access to a per-
fectly elastic supply of labor can be analyzed using equation (2) as the starting
point. The equation shows that current private and/or public consumption must
be squeezed to allow an increase in accumulation and faster expansion of the
modern sector. This squeeze can be achieved by increasing taxes: the higher
the growth rate, the lower must be consumption and the higher the required
taxes. As a direct implication, successful development is likely to be associated
with low government decits and low public debt ratios.
Consider a simple scenario in which government policy follows an adaptation
of functional nance to dual economies. Specically, assume that the ratio of
government consumption to capital is constant and that taxes are adjusted to
maintain a constant accumulation rate. Using equations (1) and (2) we have
cw(1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) =    (g + )     (1 + b) (3)
The total tax revenue is given by
T
K
= (1  ) + t( + rb) (4)
The tax rates  and/or t must be chosen to satisfy equation (3) and unless
cw = c  equations (3)-(4) imply that the tax revenue depends on the tax
structure. Consider the empirically plausible case with cw > c: Consumption
drops by c if taxes on capital income increase by one unit. To o¤set this fall
and maintain the aggregate level of consumption, taxes on wage income have
to decrease. But because the consumption rate out of wages is larger than the
consumption rate out of prots, the required fall in wage taxes is less than one
unit, and the aggregate tax revenues increase. Formally, if cwdTw+ cdT = 0;
we have dTw=dT =  c=cw >  1 and dT = dTw+dT = ( c=cw+1)dT >
0:
These results cast light on the dynamics and comparative statics of public
debt. The evolution of the debt ratio is given by
_b =  + rb  T
K
  gb (5)
where _b = db=dt is the rate of change of the debt ratio. An increase in the debt
ratio raises the interest payments (rb), but if taxes on capital income are used
as the scal instrument, the induced increase in taxes dominates. Intuitively, an
increase in wealth (a rise in b) must be associated with a fall in rentiersafter-tax
income in order to keep consumption constant; rentiersafter tax income will
not fall, however, unless taxes increase by more than the rise in pre-tax interest
payments. Thus, we have @[ + rb  TK   gb]=@b <  g < 0, and the di¤erential
equation (5) has a stable stationary solution: the public debt converges to a
steady growth value (see Appendix A).
11Ryoo and Skott (2017) and Franke (2018) analyze stabilization policy in a Harrodian
economy.
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Figure 1: Dynamic e¤ects on the debt ratio of a rise in economic growth
The di¤erential e¤ects of wage and prot taxes imply that the stability
properties become ambiguous when taxes on wage income are used as the scal
instrument. The consumption e¤ect of an increase in wealth must still be o¤set
by reductions in after-tax incomes, but high consumption rates out of wages
imply that only a small tax increase may be needed. For plausible parameter
values the stationary solution will still be stable (Appendix A), but the structure
of taxation a¤ects the long-run debt ratio: the higher the tax rate on wages, the
higher will be the debt ratio. Regressive taxation, in other words, will tend to
produce high debt ratios. Putting it di¤erently, if reductions in the debt ratio
are a priority, policy makers should shift taxation from wages towards capital
income.12
The growth rate also a¤ects the debt ratio; the higher the growth rate,
ceteris paribus, the lower the asymptotic debt ratio. An increase in accumulation
requires a squeeze on consumption, the tax rates must be raised, and an increase
in tax rates reduces the rate of change of the debt ratio _b for any given level
of b: The downward shift in the expression on the right-hand side of equation
(5) must reduce the stable stationary solution (see Figure 1). In other words,
successful development and fast structural transformation will be associated
with low public debt.
The inverse relation between growth and debt is subject to an important
caveat. Public investment in infrastructure and education can be essential for
successful development, and state-owned enterprises have been important in
the development of many economies, including China and other East Asian
12Calls for reductions in government consumption to reduce debt, by contrast, would be
counterproductive: they would raise the long-run debt ratio. This result, which may seem
paradoxical, follows from equation (3). Private consumption must ll the gap if public con-
sumption is reduced, and because consumption rates are less then one (cw < 1; c < 1) this
requirement implies that a tax reduction must exceed the fall in government consumption.
Thus, the public decit increases and the debt ratio will rise.
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countries. To the extent that successful development is associated with active
government intervention and a large share of government investment in total
investment, the implications for government decits become ambiguous: a large
share of public investment in total investment tends to raise the government
decit and the long-run debt ratio.13
The above analysis has taken as given the target rate of growth of the mod-
ern sector. It is not obvious, however, how the target rate should be chosen.
In a mature economy the full employment target for economic policy is rela-
tively uncontroversial and reasonably well-dened.14 Matters are di¤erent in
the adaptation of functional nance to a dual economy; the tradeo¤ between
accumulation and current consumption implies that the choice of the target rate
of growth can be contentious. In highly unequal dual economies there are strong
arguments in favor of a squeeze on the luxury consumption of the rich, but that
does not settle the issue. The resources that were previously absorbed by lux-
ury consumption could be used to increase accumulation or alleviate current
poverty; decision makers still face an intertemporal tradeo¤.
If we disregard the thorny questions about the appropriate weighting of cur-
rent and future welfare, there is an additional issue: the nature of the tradeo¤
may not be well understood by policy makers and the population at large. This
lack of understanding can give rise to a short-termist bias. The benets of in-
vestment come in the future, and low incomes in the informal sector provide
strong incentives for governments to engage in scal expansion and redistribu-
tion of income. If the accumulation rate and thereby the growth rate of the
formal sector  is adversely a¤ected, future incomes will su¤er, and underem-
ployment will increase (or decline more slowly). But these losses will be less
visible than immediate sacrices associated with high accumulation and low
current consumption.
3 A two-sector model of a dual economy
The one-sector model in section 2 points to dangers of scal expansions that
boost consumption. But a dual economy, by denition, has at least two dis-
tinct sectors, and a one-sector analysis can be misleading if there are signicant
interactions between the sectors.
The traditional Lewis model (Lewis 1954) identies the informal sector with
subsistence agriculture. Subsistence agriculture may be self-contained; it nei-
13The required tax revenue, which is determined by the tax structure and the equi-
librium condition (1), depends on the value of g +  + , where the accumulation rate
g = (Ipublic + Iprivate)=K includes both private and public investment and  is the ra-
tio of government consumption to capital. Taking into account public investment, the debt
dynamics, by contrast, depends on  + Ipublic=K =  + g where  is the share of public
investment in total investment. An increase in  has no e¤ect on the required taxes but in-
creases government decit. Thus, if public investment makes up a large proportion of total
investment, fast growth need not be associated with low debt.
14Measurement problems and path dependencies complicate matters in practice. These
problems are important but outside the scope of this paper.
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ther sells output to the modern sector nor provides a market for the goods
produced by the modern sector. In many developing economies, however, large
parts of agriculture are formal, while signicant proportions of non-agricultural
production belong to the informal sector. The informal sector will not in general
be self-contained in these economies. The appropriate delineation of the sectors
and the precise ways in which the sectors interact will depend on the particular
applications, but the stylized model in this section illustrates the kind of issues
that cannot be addressed by a one-sector analysis.
The formal sector typically is much more capital intensive than the informal
sector. As a simple version of this stylized fact, it may be assumed that the
informal sector has labor as its only input, while the modern sector uses capital
and labor.
The production function in the modern sector is taken to be Leontief, as
in the one-sector model in section 2. The utilization rates of capital and labor
uctuate but, as in section 2, the uctuations take place around average values
that may be taken as approximately equal to the desired levels. Formally,
M = K = LM
where M;K and LM denote output, capital and employment in the formal sec-
tor. The capital stock is predetermined in the short run, and employment is
determined by the capital stock and the level of labor productivity, LM = K=.
The capital coe¢ cient () is constant, but labor productivity () increases over
time. Using a Verdoorn-type specication, labor productivity growth (^) de-
pends on the rate of accumulation (which is equal to the rate of growth of output
in the modern sector),
^ = 0 + K^ = 0 + M^ (6)
where hats are used to denote growth rates. The product real wage (wM ) in
the modern sector is given by
wM = (1  ) (7)
where  is the prot share.
Workers who fail to get a job in the modern sector move to the informal
sector. Hence,
LA = N   LM = N(1  LM
N
) = N(1  K
N
) (8)
where N is the total labor supply. The total labor supply grows at a rate n,15
N^ = n
15 In the one-sector model no distinction was made between the growth rate of labor in
natural units and the rate of technical change; the natural growth rate was given by the sum
of the two. The distinction becomes important in this two-sector model, and n represents the
growth of the labor force in natural units. In a mature economy, the natural rate of growth is
n+ ^; if n is exogenous and labor productivity follows Verdoons law, the (semi-endogenous)
natural rate is equal to (n+ 0)(1  ):
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The informal sector produces the output A; using labor as the only input. If
pA denotes the price of informal goods, total income in the sector is pAA, and
the average income (wA) in the sector becomes
wA =
pAA
LA
Let
A = F (eLA)
where e is the employment ratein the informal sector and unemployment (1 e)
can take the form of hidden underemployment.
The production function in the informal sector may exhibit constant or de-
creasing returns to scale. A constant-returns assumption would seem reasonable
for an urban sector; it would be unreasonable for agriculture, where land is a
critical input. Given the simple specication of the structure of demand in this
paper, however, average incomes in the informal sector are independent of the
returns to scale and the rate of unemployment in the informal sector (see be-
low). Thus, the returns to scale in the informal sector and the determination of
the employment rate e can be left open.
As in section 2, formal-sector wages and capital income are taxed at the rates
 and t, respectively. Informal sector workers may benet from transfers and
targeted public services, but the avoidance of taxes and regulations is typically
seen as a dening characteristic of informality. Thus, I assume that incomes in
the informal sector go untaxed. The sum of government consumption (G) and
transfers to the informal sector () is taken to be proportional to the capital
stock: G +  = K, where  is policy determined and exogenous. Transfers
to workers in the modern sector are reected in the tax rate  , which is net of
transfers.
All after-tax wage incomes are spent on consumption, as are direct transfers
from the government to workers.16 The consumption by prot recipients in the
modern sector depends positively on after-tax income and wealth; the relation
is linearly homogeneous and, as in section 2, wealth is taken to be the sum of
the capital stock K and the government debt B.
Formally, consumption, investment and government spending are given by
C = Cw + C
= [(1 + )wALA + (1  )wMLM ] + c(1  t)(M + rB) + (K +B)
I = (g + )K
G = K   wALA
where  = =(wALA) is the ratio of informal-sector transfers to informal-sector
market income. All prices and wages are measured in terms of formal sector
goods (pM is normalized to one).
16Because workers do not save, it does not matter for present purposes whether transfers
take the form of goods or cash; the demand e¤ects are the same.
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For simplicity, it is assumed that nominal private consumption and govern-
ment spending are split between the formal and informal sectors in the same,
xed proportions, the proportion  going to the formal sector.17 Investment
goods, by contrast, tend to be relatively advanced (and often have to be im-
ported in developing economies), and as a rst approximation it seems reason-
able to assume that investment is produced by the formal sector.
These assumptions about the composition of demand imply that the equi-
librium condition for the informal A-sector can be written
wALA = pAA = (1  )(C +G) (9)
= (1  )f(1 + )wALA + (1  )wMLM + c(1  t)(M + rB)
+(K +B) + (K   wALAg
= (1  )fwALA +
[(1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b) + ]Kg
Solving for wA and using equation (8), we get
wA = 
1  

1

[(1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b) + ]H(k) (10)
where k is the modern sectors share of employment,
k =
LM
N
=
K
N
and
H(k) =
k
1  k
The IS condition provides a second equilibrium condition,18
Y = M + pAA = C + I +G
= wALA + (1  )(1  )K + c(1  t)(M + rB) + (K +B)
+(g + )K + K
or
K = (1  )(1  )K + c(1  t)( + rb)K + (1 + b)K + (g + )K + K
Dividing through by K, this equation can be solved for the accumulation rate
g,
g +  =    [(1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b) + ] (11)
17Constant expenditure shares of consumption are consistent with a Cobb-Douglas utility
function.
A distinction could be made beween consumption out of wage income (which may go pre-
dominantly to the informal sector) and consumption out of prot income (which may go
predominantly to the formal sector). Razmi et al. (2012) make this alternative assumption
about consumption patterns.
18The equilibrium condition for the formal good could have been used instead. The two
conditions are equivalent in the two-sector model when the equilibrium condition for the
informal sector is met.
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The dynamics of the debt ratio, nally, is given by
_b = ( + rb  t( + rb)  (1  ))  gb (12)
Equations (11)-(12) correspond to equations (3) and (5) in the one-sector
model. There is a tradeo¤ between growth and current consumption, and if  is
kept constant, equation (11) implies that suitable adjustments in the tax rates
are needed to maintain a constant target rate of growth gT , that is, to ensure
that (11) is satised with g = gT . As in section 2, this adaptation of functional
nance to a dual economy produces a di¤erential equation for the debt ratio.
The stationary point is unambiguously stable, if the tax rate on capital income
is used as the scal instrument, and stable for plausible parameter values, if the
tax rate on wage income () is used as the instrument. As in section 2, the
long-run value of b depends inversely on the growth rate.
Limited institutional capabilities of the scal authorities may hamper the
implementation of the dual-economy version of functional nance, but even if
we disregard this constraint on government policy, the temptations to prioritize
current consumption carry over to the two-sector model. Populist movements
may have neither the inclination nor the power to confront political and eco-
nomic elites by imposing signicant taxes on capital income and luxury con-
sumption; reduced taxes on wages and increased government social spending,
by contrast, may nd widespread support. As in the one-sector model, these
policies will reduce the long-run growth rate (equation (11)). But the two-sector
model introduces an additional complication.
Dual economies with large informal sectors have small capital stocks, low
levels of modern-sector labor productivity, and low modern-sector wages.19 But
if incomes are even lower in the informal sector, the supply of labor to the
formal sector will still be highly elastic. By assumption, workers in the informal
sector do not pay taxes, and their relative position is enhanced by government
transfers. Combining equations (7)-(11), the post-tax income ratio is
wA(1 + )
(1  )wM =
1

(1 + )(1  )
(1  )(1  ) [   (g + )]H(k) (13)
Equation (13) determines the post-tax wage ratio as a function of  ; ; ; g
and k. The ratio depends positively on the employment composition k =
LM=N = K=(N); which changes over time. Employment shifts away from the
informal sector and towards the formal sector if the accumulation rate exceeds
the natural rate of growth of the formal sector(N^ + ^). As the formal sec-
tor expands during a process of successful development, the average income in
the informal sector rises for any given values of the tax parameters, the growth
rate and the prot share (equation (10)). The improvement for informal sector
workers carries over to the relative wage (equation (13)); workers in the informal
sector gradually catch up with workers in the modern sector.
19Learning by doing, as specied in equation (6), implies that the level of labor productivity
is related to the size of capital stock.
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High post-tax relative incomes in the informal sector can endanger the de-
velopment process. Duality requires that formal-sector jobs be seen as more
attractive than staying in the informal sector. Thus, the post-tax wage rate
in the formal sector must be at or above some threshold level related to the
average income in the informal sector. Suppose duality requires that
(1  )wM  (1 + )wA (14)
There are no entry barriers to the informal sector, and if this lower bound on
after-tax wages in the modern sector represents a reservation wage, the labor
supply to the formal sector would cease to be elastic if the inequality did not
hold.
The dual-economy conditionin (14) can be given an alternative interpreta-
tion, however. The lower bound on modern-sector wages may reect established
pay norms, rather than a constraint on the ability of the modern sector to hire
workers. Workers receive a wage premium and willingly accept modern-sector
jobs, but a violation of the norms is seen as unfair, and there may be adverse ef-
fects on morale and e¤ortas well as increasing nominal wage demands (Akerlof
and Yellen 1990, Skott 2005).
Suppose that a shock has led to a violation of the dual economy condition.
Nominal wages in the formal sector start increasing, but this increase may not
return relative wages to the norm. Increased money wages have no e¤ect on
the product real wage in the modern sector as long as rms maintain a xed
markup, and if tax rates, government spending and accumulation rates were kept
constant, nominal wages in the informal sector would rise pari passu (equation
(13)) The wage ratio would be unchanged, and the scene would be set for
explosive ination. Demand and supply factors combine to produce this result.
High aggregate demand and/or redistributional policies raise incomes in the
informal sector; the rise in informal sector incomes leads to cost-push ination
in the formal sector; increasing nominal wages and prices in the formal sector are
transmitted back to the informal sector in the form of rising nominal demand,
and nominal incomes in the informal sector increase. The loop is closed, and
inationary pressures can develop despite high levels of underemployment and
normal utilization rates of capital in the modern sector; Martins and Skott
(2020) discuss the cross sectoral interactions and the implications for ination
in greater detail.
Increasing ination will prompt a policy response. Adjustments could be
made to the structure of taxes and transfers in order to raise the relative wage
in the formal sector and maintain the target rate of growth. This could be
achieved by shifting taxes towards the rich (raising the tax on prot income to
o¤set the demand e¤ects of a reduction in the taxation of workers in the modern
sector) or by regressive changes that o¤set reductions in  by reductions in :
More likely than not, however, inationary pressures will be seen as a sign of a
general overheating of the economy that needs to be countered by contractionary
policies.20 Thus, suppose that faced with inationary pressures, governments
20Martins and Skott (2020) consider a scenario along these lines, showing that a combination
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abandon growth targets for the modern sector when the dual economy constraint
becomes binding. Policy, instead, is adjusted to ensure that the dual economy
constraint (14) will be satised as an equality. For given values of the policy
parameters t and , the required relative wage in the modern sector  and the
predetermined capital ratio k, equations (13)-(14) dene a relation between the
prot share  and the growth rate g:
1

=
1

(1 + )(1  )
(1  )(1  ) [   (g + )]H(k) (15)
The prot share need not be constant. Firms pricing decisions react to
demand conditions and, following a Robinson-Kaldor-Harrod tradition in post-
Keynesian economics, it may be assumed that high demand and persistent pos-
itive gaps between actual and desired utilization rates lead to increasing prot
shares and accumulation rates.21 Disregarding short-run uctuations, the av-
erage utilization rate must be (approximately) at the desired level, that is,
M=K = . With utilization at the desired rate, the rate of growth can be
determined by the strength of the incentives to expand production as reected
in the prot share. Formally, rmspricing and investment decisions imply a
second, positive relation between growth and protability,
g = g(); g0 > 0 (16)
Equation (16) is consistent with a variety of specications of the short-run dy-
namics for pricing and investment; Appendix B outlines three examples.
Equations (15)-(16) take the place of functional nance and a commitment
to a target growth rate. The general story is as outlined above. Violations
of the dual economy constraint and the ensuing inationary pressures lead to
contractionary policies; prot margins and accumulation rates decline as uti-
lization rates fall below the desired rate; ination is curbed by the decline in
prot shares; policy is relaxed to allow utilization rates to return to the desired
rate; prot shares stop falling, but the new steady growth path has lower prot
shares and accumulation rates. In short, the dual economy condition is satised
by a squeeze on the prot share which raises the modern sector wage wM . The
incentives for rms to expand are blunted, and growth rates su¤er.
The story presumes that a decline in the prot share and accumulation
raises the relative wage of modern sector workers and reduces the inationary
pressures. If it did not, the adjustment process would be unstable. The stability
requirementis satised as long as the sensitivity of the growth rate to variations
in the prot share is su¢ ciently low.22 Formally, the right hand side of equation
of large relative income shocks and ination targeting can squeeze the modern, tradable sector.
21Skott and Zipperer (2012) discuss di¤erences and similarities between di¤erent post-
Keynesian models.
22This stability condition is di¤erent from the standard Robinsonian condition. The stan-
dard condition ignores policy and considers the e¤ect of changes in prot shares on aggregate
demand. In the present context, policy adjusts to the inationary pressures, and a condition
is needed to ensure that a decline in the prot share in the formal sector will raise the relative
wage of formal-sector workers, taking into account the e¤ect of changes in prot shares on the
accumulation rate.
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(15) is decreasing in  if
(1  )g0() <    g()   (17)
If the condition (17) is satised and the duality condition is binding, equations
(15)-(16) dene the prot share and growth rate as implicit functions of k; ;  ; :
We have
 = (k; ;  ; ); 1 < 0; 2 < 0; 3 < 0; 4 < 0
g = g() = g(k; ;  ; ); 1 < 0; 2 < 0; 3 < 0; 4 < 0
Thus, increases in  and  reduce economic growth if the dual economy condition
is binding.
The empirical relevance of this analysis may seem questionable. The relative
wage norms, rst, are likely to be path dependent. Di¤erences between actual
and fair relative wages can be eliminated if wage ratios that are initially seen
a unfair gradually acquire the status of reference ratios and become what is
expected (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1986, Skott 2005). Actual wages, in Hickss
(1975, p. 65) words, may get the "sanction of custom"; they become "what
is expected; and (admittedly on a low level of fairness) what is expected is
fair". This endogeneity of fair wages implies that a gradual expansion of the
modern sector a gradual increase in k may be accommodated by adjustments
in the wage norm ; large shocks to relative wages, by contrast, cannot be
accommodated in this way (Martins and Skott 2020).
It may seem unlikely, second, for the duality condition to be binding if the
modern sector is small; the expression on the right hand side of equation (15)
goes to zero if the share of modern sector employment goes to zero (which
implies that H(k) goes to zero). But not all dual economies have tiny modern
sectors and, perhaps more important, the two-sector model underestimates the
potential risks of premature maturity. The risks increase signicantly if the
economy is open and we add oilas a resource-based, export sector. Oilcan
be seen as a shorthand for a range of activities that are sensitive to external
shifts in demand, but where the input of domestic labor and capital changes
little in response to variations in export prices or the discovery of new resource
endowments. Oil, minerals and some other commodities are among the goods
that t this category.
4 A three-sector model of an open economy
The extension to three sectors is relatively straightforward if the inputs of do-
mestic labor and capital in the oil sector are negligible and oil is a pure export
good.
Oil exports generate private rents and public taxes and royalties. Let pxX
denote total oil revenues (in terms of domestic formal goods) and let  be
the fraction that goes to the state. Assume, as a rst approximation, that oil
revenues are being spent on consumption; private rents (1 )pxX are spent on
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private consumption, while government spending is now given by (G+)=K =
G=K + wALA = 0 + pxX=K: The motivation for this respecication of
government spending is simple: oil exports a¤ect both government revenues
and aggregate income, and both of these are likely to have an inuence on what
is deemed the appropriate amount of public spending.
Empirically, virtually all tradable goods are produced by formal sectors.
The output of the informal sector therefore is taken to be nontradable. But
domestic consumption and the equilibrium condition for the informal sector are
a¤ected by oil, and this in turn a¤ects average incomes in the informal sector.
By assumption the oil sector uses no domestic inputs of labor and capital, but
still assuming that the fraction 1   of private and public consumption goes
to the informal sector equation (10) now includes an extra term:
wA = 
1  

1

[(1  )(1 )+ c(1  )(+ rb)+(1+ b)+0+
pxX
K
]H(k)
(18)
Turning to trade, most developing countries face balance of payments con-
straints. As a stylized version of these constraints, it is assumed that trade must
be balanced, that is,
NX = 0
If this balance of payments constraint is satised, the IS condition remains
unchanged, compared to the two-sector model of a closed economy. Domestic
production and exports increase by the value of oil (pxX); but imports go up
by the same amount,
Y = pAA+M + pxX = C + I +G+NX = C + I +G (19)
= wALA + (1  )(1  )K + [c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b)]K
+(0 +
pxX
K
)K + (g + )K (20)
Subtracting pxX and pAA = wALA from both sides and dividing by K, this
equilibrium condition can be written
 = (1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b) + 0 + g +  (21)
This equation is equivalent to equation (11), the only di¤erence being that 0
has taken the place of .
Using equations (18)-(21), the post-tax relative wage now becomes
(1 + )wA
(1  )wM =
(1 + )
(1  )(1  )
1  

1

f[   (g + )]H(k) + pxX
K
H(k)g (22)
Oil is a pure export good, and the price of oil in foreign currency (px) is taken
as exogenous. Hence,
px = E
px
pM
= 
px
pM
=  (23)
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where E denotes the nominal exchange rate;  = EpM=pM is the price of
foreign tradable goods in foreign currency and to simplify notation, the foreign
currency prices of oil and foreign tradable goods have been normalized to one.
pX = p

M = 1. I shall refer to  as the real exchange rate.
Combining equations (6) and (22)-(23), the duality condition can be written
(see Appendix C)
(1 + )wA
(1  )wM =
1

=
(1 + )
(1  )(1  )
1  

1

f[   (g + )] K
1 
B   K1 
+
X
BK   K g (24)
where
B = B0e
(n+0)t
It follows from equation (24) that a positive shock to X increases the relative
post-tax incomes in the informal sector. This result in itself is not surprising.
A booming oil sector raises private consumption and allows the government to
pursue popular policies of expansion and redistribution. But the equation has a
more subtle implication. The duality condition may now be violated even if the
M -sector is small: the right-hand side of equation (24) goes to innity for K !
0. This is in sharp contrast to the two-sector model (corresponding to X = 0)
in which the right-hand side goes to zero for K ! 0. The contrast becomes
important  and empirically relevant  if oil revenues make up a signicant
proportion of the aggregate income.
Equations (16) and (24) dene the prot share  as an implicit function of
 ; ; ;K;B and X. The right-hand side of equation (24) is decreasing in X,
and if the modied Robinsonian stability condition (17) is satised, it follows
that d=d(X) < 0: Intuitively, a rise in oil revenues gives a boost to consump-
tion demand, and informal sector incomes rise. With a given relative wage, the
prot share in the domestic modern sector su¤ers, and the accumulation rate
falls; the economy experiences a Dutch disease.
In extreme cases, an oil boom can produce permanent deindustrialization
and a long-run reduction in incomes. To see this, consider a simple case with
n = 0 = 0 and, hence, B = B0: In this case, equation (24) implies that
 !  1 for K ! 0, that is, the graph in Figure 2 of  as a function of K
has a vertical asymptote at K = 0 (see Appendix C for details). Thus, the
solution for  becomes negative when K is su¢ ciently small. The expansion
of the modern sector, however, requires that the prot share exceed a critical
value; formally, we must have K^ = g() > (n+ 0)=(1  ), which in this case
simplies to g() > 0.
An increase in X reduces the prot share for any given value of K, the
-function shifts down, and the growth rate of the capital stock declines. The
(net) accumulation rate can turn negative, and the economy converges towards
a state with K = M = 0 and Y = X=: Had there been no oil (X = 0),
aggregate income would also have converged to a constant, but if the economy
is su¢ ciently large, the long-run value of Y would have been higher than in
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Figure 2: Permanent decline of the modern sector after a temporary oil boom
the case with deindustrialization (see Appendix C for details). Intuitively, the
size of the economy is important because the long-run productivity gains from
industrialization derive from (dynamic) increasing returns to scale. Thus, a
large economy will achieve higher productivity levels than a small economy,
and the gains from industrialization must outweigh the income from oil if the
economy is su¢ ciently large.
Even a temporary boom can lead to permanent deindustrialization. Consider
an economy with an oil sector and suppose that the capital stock is above
the industrialization threshold (KT ) associated with the initial oil revenue. A
positive shock to X now reduces the prot share for any given capital stock,
and the threshold rises.23 If the shock is large enough, the capital stock is
below the new threshold and starts falling, and if it declines su¢ ciently during
the oil boom, the economy may nd itself locked in a development trap when
X returns to its previous value. This outcome is illustrated in Figure 2. At
the start of the oil boom we have K = K0 > KT : The oil shock generates
a downwards shift in the -function and K starts declining. The -function
shifts back to its initial position at the end of the boom; if the capital stock has
declined to K1 < KT , however, it continues to decline. Premature maturity has
pushed the economy into a deindustrialization trap.
The above analysis has considered a shock to X. The real exchange rate,
however, is endogenous. As a general specication, the division of domestic
demand between imports and domestically produced formal goods will depend
on the ratio of foreign to domestic formal sector prices in common currency;
that is, on the real exchange rate : Thus, the trade balance condition can be
23A shock to the international price of oil, pX would have the same e¤ect as a rise in
domestic output X:
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written
NX
K
=
X
K
+  (;
C +G
K
; g + ) = 0 (25)
where  (; C+GK ; g + ) is the net exports of non-oil. Equations (16), (9), (19),
(24) and (25) can be used to solve for g; ; ; wALA and (C +G)=K.
The solution is simple if imports and domestically produced formal goods
are perfect substitutes.24 Net exports become perfectly elastic at a constant real
exchange rate in this case,  = , and a shock to X maps directly into a shock
to X: The constant real exchange rate can be plugged into equation (24), and
the earlier analysis now applies without any other modications.25
If imports and domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes, a
shock to X a¤ects the real exchange rate , but the qualitative results will be
unchanged as long as a positive resource shock (an increase in export revenues
in foreign currency) does not produce an appreciation that is so large that the
resource revenues in domestic currency decline. Formally, this (mild) condition
is satised if
d log X
d logX
=
d log 
d logX
+ 1 > 0
5 Discussion
Aggregate demand policy is important for long-run growth but so is the supply
side, and the supply sides are di¤erent in mature and dual economies. The
informal sector is very large in poor economies, the productivity levels are low
in the informal sector, economic growth comes from the formal sector, and
workers in the informal sector would move to the formal sector if o¤ered a
chance. Workers in the two sectors, moreover, have similar qualications, and
the formal sector is not held back by a shortage of skilled workers (La Porta
and Shleifer (2014).
Both mainstream and post-Keynesian models tend to ignore or play down
the di¤erences between mature and dual economies. These di¤erences, however,
have implications for economic policy. Aggregate demand policies that work well
in one economy may be disastrous in economies with a di¤erent supply side. Ma-
ture economies are labor constrained and may face structural aggregate demand
problems; dual economies are capital constrained and face structural transfor-
mation problems. The policy problems and the appropriate scal policies are
quite di¤erent. A permanent stimulus may be needed in mature economies with
a low natural rate of growth. The warranted growth rate must be brought into
equality with the natural rate, and a scal stimulus is helpful precisely because
it reduces the warranted rate.
24This assumption clearly makes no sense if applied to the short run. It takes time as
well as marketing e¤orts or price discounts to break into export markets, but the assumption
arguably provides a reasonable rst approximation for the long run.
25With perfect substitutability the shock to X can be given an alternative closed-economy
interpretation: the model becomes isomorphic to a closed-economy model with X as a windfall
increase in the ow supply of modern-sector goods.
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In dual economies, by contrast, a reduction of the warranted growth rate
is the opposite of what one wants. Successful development requires the sta-
bilization of the actual growth rate at a high warranted rate, and sustained
scal expansion and high shares of consumption in income can hold back struc-
tural transformation. Sectoral interactions, moreover, can increase the risks of
deindustrialization.
The framework in this paper is quite di¤erent from that of New Neoclassical
Synthesis. DSGE models play down the role of aggregate demand policy in
the medium and long run and misspecify the supply side. Profound sectoral
di¤erences are ignored, hyper-rational representative agents are at the center of
the analysis, and the economy uctuates around a steady growth path with a
natural rate of unemployment.
The approach is closer to (post-) Keynesian theory. Economic development
and the growth of the modern sector require investment, and private rms will
not invest if there is insu¢ cient demand for their output. If the expansion of the
capital stock relies on private investment, incentives must be created for rms in
the modern sector to carry out the investment, and the management of aggregate
demand becomes an essential prerequisite of fast growth. The management of
aggregate demand becomes especially important, if the warranted growth path
is unstable and low aggregate demand can lead to cumulative decline. But
capital constraints complicate the picture: it is not enough to create incentives
for investment, the resources for investment must also be available. Managing
aggregate demand is di¤erent from sustained stimulus.26
In a capital constrained economy, a sustained increase in the rate of accu-
mulation requires reductions in the share of private and public consumption (or
an increase in net imports). This key ingredient in the analysis in sections 2-3 is
subject to qualication: in principle, resources for accumulation could be found
by eliminating or reducing waste, wherever that waste may be found.
Attacks on big government often draw on this theme, and public programs
can become sources on ine¢ ciency and corruption (defenders of public programs
should be the ercest critics whenever this happens). But government programs
are not the only source of social waste. Ine¢ ciency and rent-seeking activities
abound in the private sector, from zero-sum interactions in the nancial sphere
to bloated bureaucracies, market failures and misallocation of resources in pri-
vate healthcare systems.
In the post-Keynesian literature, Kaleckian models rely on particular inef-
ciencies and market failures. There are no binding capital constraints and no
long-run tradeo¤ between the share of consumption and the rate of economic
growth in these models. The specication of the investment function in these
models assumes that a large and sustained fall in utilization will have only small
negative e¤ects on the accumulation rate. As the ip side of this assumption, a
positive shock to demand a reduction in saving rates, for instance generates
a large demand-induced increase in the steady growth value of the utilization
26See Aboobaker and Ugurlu (2020) for a recent discussion with special reference to modern
monetary theory.
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rate. This increase allows long-run increases in both the accumulation rate and
the share of consumption in income.
Empirically, the models predict that countries with low shares of investment
in output will tend to have high rates of economic growth, a prediction that
is at odds with the evidence (e.g. Girardi and Pariboni 2018). Behaviorally,
the specication of investment assumes that, blinded by uncertainty and con-
ventions, private rms keep investing, even if they have large amounts of excess
capacity. The resources that go into idle capital stocks could have been used to
expand consumption, and this behavior is clearly socially wasteful. It is waste-
ful, however, not just from a social perspective, but also from the perspective
of a single, goal oriented rm that aims to make prots. Nothing compels the
rm to keep investing if it has large amounts of unwanted excess capacity; this
makes it hard to provide a behavioral justication for the Kaleckian investment
function (Skott 2012).
Sections 2-4 adopted an extreme specication in which utilization must be at
an exogenously given desired rate in steady growth. The long-run tradeo¤ be-
tween consumption and investment does not depend on this extreme assumption;
it holds as long as the long-run accumulation function is su¢ ciently sensitive
to variations in capital utilization, taking into account both the direct e¤ects
of utilization on accumulation and indirect e¤ects via induced changes in the
prot share.27 The empirical estimation of investment functions is notoriously
di¢ cult, but industry level evidence points to large di¤erences in growth rates
across industries and only modest di¤erences in average utilization rates. The
US computer industry, for instance, recorded average annual growth rates above
25 percent between 1970 and 2000 and had average utilization rates below 80
percent; over the same period the textile industry grew at an average annual
rate of less than 2 percent and had utilization rates above 80 percent.28
Utilization rates are subject to measurement problems,29 but macroeconomic
evidence also casts doubt on claims that substantial immediate expansion of
consumption can be achieved without sacricing long-term growth. Populist
governments from Argentina to Venezuela and Zimbabwe have pursued policies
that promised win-win solutions for everyone but culminated in economic crisis
and decline. Less dramatically, the experience of resource-rich economies since
27Formally, if dg=d(u) denotes this total derivative, the condition is that
dg
d(u)
> 1
The tradeo¤ condition is stricter than the condition for Harrodian instability. Harrodian
instability only requires that the the long-run accumulation rate be more sensitive than the
saving capital ratio to variations in the output capital ratio, that is,
dg
du
>
d S
K
du
28Data for computer and peripheral equipment(NAICS 3341) and textile mills(NAICS
313) from FRED.
29Nikiforos (2016) discusses some of the issues and their implications; Girardi and Pariboni
(2019) question his analysis.
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the turn of the century illustrate the risks of premature maturity. The com-
modities boom in the early 2000s generated (relatively) fast growth in many
Latin American economies.30 But consistent with the model in section 4 
the tradable sector su¤ered, and deindustrialization left the economies in a bad
state when the commodities boom came to end.
Appendix A: Debt dynamics
The evolution of the debt ratio is given by
_b =  + rb  T
K
  gb
where
T
K
= (1  ) + t( + rb)
The tax rates must satisfy
cw(1  )(1  ) + c(1  t)( + rb) + (1 + b) =    (g + )   (26)
By assumption, the right-hand side of equation (26) is kept constant. It
follows that
d
C
K
=  cw(1  )d   c( + rb) + c(1  t)rdb+ db = 0
Thus, if t is the scal instrument and d = 0, we have
@t
@b
=
c(1  t)r + 
c( + rb)
and
d_b
db
= r   d
T
K
db
  g = r   tr   ( + rb)@t
@b
=  (g + 
c
) < 0
Analogously, if  is the scal instrument,
d_b
db
= r   d
T
K
db
  g = r   tr   (1  )@
@b
= (1  t)(1  c
cw
)r   (g + 
cw
)
 (1  t)r   (g + )
Empirical estimates suggest that 0:02 <  < 0:06: With a target growth rate of
0:04 and  = 0:04; t = 0:1; a real interest rate below 0:09 is su¢ cient to ensure
stability.
30Martins and Skott (2020) discuss the Brazilian case in greater detail.
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Appendix B: The growth-prot nexus
Dynamic adjustments in both g and  in response to deviations of actual from
desired utilization are consistent with the long-run relation between the levels
of g and . As a simple example, let
_g = g(u  ud)
_ = (u  ud)
This specication implies that _g =
g

_. Integration now yields,
g = g0 +
g


where g0 is an arbitrary constant of integration.
The linearity of the relation between g and  is a special case. A simple
Robinson-Steindl version of the dynamics has the prot share react to deviations
of actual from desired utilization, but the adjustment in accumulation is slightly
di¤erent: accumulation now adjusts towards an equilibrium rate determined by
utilization and the prot share,
_g = g(g
(u; )  g)
_ = (u  ud)
A stationary solution for this system has u = ud and g = g(ud; ). The relation
between growth and the prot share is positive but, in general, nonlinear.
As a third example, a Harrod-Kaldor version retains the specication of
changes in accumulation as determined by deviations of actual from desired
utilization. But now the prot share is a fast variable that adjusts to clear the
goods market; output becomes a state variable and the pricing/output decision
describes rmsoutput decisions the growth rate of output as a function of
the demand signal that they receive. A shock to demand raises the prot share
and rms respond by increasing output (Skott 1989). Formally,
_g = g(u  ud)
Y^ = h()
A stationary solution has u = ud; Y^ = g and g = h():
Appendix C: The duality condition and long-run
outcomes in the three-sector model
Equations (22)-(23) imply that
(1 + )wA
(1  )wM =
(1 + )
(1  )(1  )
1  

1

f[   (g + )]H(k) + X
K
H(k)g
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or, using the denition of H(k);
(1 + )wA
(1  )wM =
(1 + )
(1  )(1  )
1  

1

f[ (g+)] K
N   K +
X
N   K g (27)
The value of N can be found by integration of Verdorns law (equation (6)).
We have
^ = 0 + K^
Hence,
log  = b0 + 0t+  logK
or
N = eb0e0tKN0e
nt = B0e
(0+n)t (28)
where B0 = eb0N0
Combining (27)-(28) and the duality condition, we get
1

=
(1 + )
(1  )(1  )
1  

1

f[   (g + )] K
1 
B   K1  +
X
BK   K g (29)
where
B = B0e
(n+0)t
Long-run outcomes when n = 0 = 0 and B = B0: The right hand side of
(29) is increasing in  if the modied Robinsonian stability condition is satised.
For given values of  < 1 and X > 0; moreover, the right-hand side goes to
innity for K ! 0 from above and for K ! (B0=)1=(1 ) from below. Thus,
we must have  !  1 for K ! 0 from above and for K ! (B0=)1=(1 ) from
below. It follows that the solution for  becomes negative when K is close to 0
or (B0=)1=(1 ); that is, the graph for  in Figure 2 has vertical asymptotes at
K = 0 and K = B1=(1 )0 =: Thus, the solution for  becomes negative when
K is su¢ ciently small.
The expansion of the modern sector requires that the prot share exceed a
critical value; formally, that K^ = g() > 0. An increase in X reduces the prot
share for any given value of K, the -function shifts down, and the growth rate
of the capital stock declines. The (net) accumulation rate can turn negative,
and if this happens, the economy converges towards a state with K =M = 0.
With no modern sector and no investment, the demand for imports IM is
given by
IM = (1  )(C +G)
while the NX = 0 condition implies that
Y = C +G (30)
X   IM = 0 (31)
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Combining (30)-(31), we have
Y =
X

Now consider the implications of X = 0. In this case, using (29), the capital
stock K will converge to a positive value:
K ! K = [ 
B0
(1 + 
)
]1=(1 )
where

 =
(1  )(1  )
(   )(1 + )(1  )
 = g 1(0)
Thus, a su¢ ciently large value of B0 will ensure that the long-run level of
income and consumption will be higher in an economy without natural resources
(X = 0) than in one with natural resources (X > 0). Intuitively, the size of
the economy is important because of the dynamic increasing returns; a small
economy is unable to achieve the learning that raises average incomes..
References
[1] Aboobaker, A. and Ugurlu, E.N. (2020) "Weaknesses of MMT as a Guide
to Development Policy". UMass Working Paper 2020-09.
[2] Akerlof, G.A., Yellen, J.L. (1990)"The fair wage-e¤ort hypothesis and un-
employment". Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 254-283.
[3] Blecker, R. and Settereld, M. (2019) Heterodox macroeconomics: models
of demand, distribution and growth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
[4] Bresser-Pereira, Carlos, L., Oreiro, J.L. and Marconi, N. (2014) Develop-
mental macroeconomics: new developmentalism as a growth strategy. Rout-
ledge.
[5] Corden W. M. and Neary J. P. (1982) "Booming Sector and De-
industrialisation in a Small Open Economy". Economic Journal. 92 (De-
cember), pp. 82548.
[6] Foley, D., Michl, T., and Tavani, D. (2019) Growth and distribution. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[7] Franke, R. (2018) "Can Monetary Policy Tame Harrodian Instability?"
Metroeconomica, 69(3), pp. 593-618.
[8] Girardi, D. and Pariboni, R. (2018) "Autonomous Demand and the Invest-
ment Share". UMass Amherst Economics Working Paper 2018-18.
25
[9] Girardi, D. and Pariboni, R. (2019) "Normal utilization as the adjust-
ment variable in neo-Kaleckian growth models: a critique". Metroeconom-
ica, 70(2), pp. 341-358.
[10] Hein, E. (2014) Distribution and Growth After Keynes. Elgar.
[11] Hicks, J. R. (1975) Crisis in Keynesian economics. Blackwell, Oxford.
[12] Kaldor, N. (1966) Causes of the slow rate of economic growth of the UK.
Cambridge" Cambridge University Press.
[13] Kaldor, N. (1970) "The case for regional policies". Scottish Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 18, pp. 337-348.
[14] Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. and Thaler, R. (1986) "Fairness as a constraint
on prot seeking: Entitlements in the market". American Economic Re-
view, 76(4), pp. 728-741.
[15] Krugman, P. (1987) "The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and
the competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatcher". Journal of Development
Economics, 27(1-2), pp. 41-55.
[16] La Porta, R. and Shleifer, A. (2014) "Informality and development". Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), pp. 109-126.
[17] Lavoie. M (2014) Post-Keynesian Economics. Elgar.
[18] Leibenstein, H. (1957) Economic backwardness and economic growth. New
York: Wiley
[19] Lerner, A.P. (1943) Functional Finance and the Federal Debt". Social
Research, 10(1), pp. 38-51.
[20] Lewis, W.A. (1954) "Economic development with unlimited supplies of
labor". The Manchester School, 22(2), pp. 139-191.
[21] Martins, G.K. and Skott. P. (2020) "Macroeconomic policy, ination and
deindustrialization in a dual economy". UMass Working Paper 2020-08.
[22] Nikiforos, M. (2016) "On the utilisation controversy: a theoretical and
empirical discussion of the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution".
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 40, pp. 437467.
[23] Nurkse, R. (1953) Problems of capital formation in underdeveloped coun-
tries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[24] Razmi, A., Rapetti, M. and Skott, P. (2012) The Real Exchange Rate and
Economic Development. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol.
23, 151-169.
[25] Rodrik, D. (2016) "Premature deindustrialization". Journal of economic
growth, 21(1), pp. 1-33.
26
[26] Ros, J. (2013) Rethinking economic development, growth and institutions.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[27] Rosenstein-Rodan, P. (1943) "Problems of industrialization in Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe". Economic Journal, pp. 202-211.
[28] Ryoo, S. and Skott, P. (2013) Public Debt and Full Employment in a
Stock-Flow Consistent Model of a Corporate Economy. Journal of Post
Keynesian Economics, 35 (4), pp. 511-527.
[29] Ryoo, S. and Skott, P. (2017) Fiscal and Monetary Policy Rules in an
Unstable Economy". Metroeconomica, 68:3, pp. 500548
[30] Schlicht, E.(2006) Public Debt as Private Wealth: Some Equilibrium Con-
siderations.Metroeconomica,57 (4), 494520.
[31] Skott, P. (1989) Conict and E¤ective Demand in Economic Growth. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press
[32] Skott, P. (2005) "Fairness as a source of hysteresis in employment and
relative wages". Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 57, pp.
305331.
[33] Skott, P. (2012) "Theoretical and Empirical Shortcomings of the Kaleckian
Investment Function". Metroeconomica, 63, pp. 109-138.
[34] Skott, P. (2016) Aggregate demand, functional nance and secular stag-
nation. European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Interven-
tion, Vol. 13( 2), pp. 172188.
[35] Skott, P. (2020) "Aggregate demand policy in mature and dual economies".
In Basu D. and Das, D. (eds) Conict, Demand and Economic Develop-
ment: Essays in Honor of Amit Bhaduri, Routledge.
[36] Skott, P. and Gomez-Ramiriz, L. (2018) Credit constraints and economic
growth in a dual economy. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics,
45, pp. 64-76.
[37] Skott, P. and Zipperer, B. (2012) An empirical evaluation of three post
Keynesian models. Intervention  European Journal of Economics and
Economic Policies, 9(2), pp. 277-308.
27
